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EFFECT OF PROBATE CODE UPON THE CLAIMS OF ALIEN
NONRESIDENTS TO SHARE IN CALIFORNIA ESTATES
By GRAH_&m KELLY
A lawyer examining the claim of an alien nonresident to share in a
California estate will find a variety of laws in federal treaties, the state Consti-
tution and codes and in state and federal decisions which govern such claims.
California, contra to the common law, was originally extremely liberal in
granting rights to alien claimants. The original rule still exists as Civil Code
section 671: "Any person, whether citizen or alien, may take, hold, and
dispose of any property, real or personal, within this state." The word "take"
was interpreted to include an alien's taking by will or intestate succession.'
The state Constitution, article 1, section 17, provides: "Resident aliens
of the white or African race and who are eligible to citizenship have the same
rights to transmit or inherit all property, other than real estate, as native
born citizens." This section has been construed to protect the designated
rights of the described groups from legislative infringement upon those
rights,2 but not to restrict the Legislature from granting other or greater
rights to these groups or to other groups not included in the description.'
Under this interpretation, Civil Code section 671 did not conflict with this
section of the Constitution and validly extended such greater right to all
aliens.
History of Probate Code Section 259 et seq.
The newest additions to these general regulations are Probate Code
sections 259, 259.1 and 259.2.' These sections introduced the principle of
reciprocity as limiting the right of an alien nonresident to take by will or
intestacy from a California estate. 5
'Billings v. Hauver, 65 Cal. 593, 4 Pac. 639.
'Blythe v. Hinckley, 127 Cal. 431, 59 Pac. 787.
3 bid., State v. Smith, 70 Cal. 153, 12 Pac. 121.
'1941 version: See. 259: Aliens residing abroad: Dependence of rights upon reciprocity. The
rights of aliens not residing within the United States or its territories to take either real or personal
property or the proceeds thereof in this state by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the
same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the United States is dependent in each case
upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the United States to take real
and personal property upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective
countries of which such aliens are inhabitants and citizens and upon the rights of citizens of the
United States to receive by payment to them within the United States or its territories money origi-
nating from the estates of persons dying within such foreign countries.
Sec. 259.1: Same: Burden of establishing that rights are reciprocal. The burden shall be upon
such nonresident aliens to establish the fact of existence of the reciprocal rights set forth in
section 259.
See. 259.2: Same: Disposition of property on finding of nonreciprocity. If such reciprocal
rights are not found to exist and if no heirs other than such aliens are found eligible to take such
property, the property shall be disposed of as escheated property.
'Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal.2d 580; Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal.2d 574.
(128)
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Originally effective in December, 1941, these sections denied any right
in alien nonresidents to share in either realty or personalty unless American
citizens would have the right to take property of the same class from an estate
in the country of the alien's residence on a basis of equality with nationals of
that country; and furthermore, the proceeds of property so passing to an
American citizen by will or succession must, as a matter of right, be payable
within the United States or its territories in American money. The burden
of proving such reciprocal rights was placed upon the nonresident alien
claiming an interest in a California estate.
In September, 1945, amendments became effective which combined all
provisions into a single new section 259, deleted the requirement that the
proceeds of a foreign estate must be receivable in American. money within
the United States, and created a disputable presumption that reciprocal rights
did exist, thus shifting the burden of proof to one disputing the right of an
alien to take because of section 259.
New amendments, effective in September, 1947, substantially reinstated
the 1941 sections, returning the burden of proof to the alien claimant, but
not requiring that the proceeds of a foreign estate be payable within this
country.
From 1941 to the present time the law has stated that if all alien claim-
ants were barred by section 259 et seq., from taking and if there were no
persons resident within the United States or its territories who were qualified
to take the estate, all undistributed property should escheat to the state.
During the war, the Alien Property Custodian was empowered to vest
in himself all the right, title and interest of aliens of many nationalities in
property within American territory.' Under his "vesting orders" the United
States asserted claims to many California estates.' Resulting litigation pro-
duced authoritative interpretations of most of the present statutory wording,
if we assume that like phrases in like statutes will be interpreted identically.
Constitutionality of Sections
These sections have held up under repeated attacks upon their constitu-
tionality. They prevailed over assertions that they were in conflict with the
""Trading With the Enemy Act," 40 Stats. 411, chap. 106; 50 U.S.C. App., see. 1 et seq., as
amended.
'Estate of Knutzen, 31 CaL2d 573; Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal.2d 580; Estate of Blak,
65 Cal.App.2d 232; Estate of Michaud, 53 CalApp.2d 835; Estate of Carcofingas, 24 Cal.2d 519;
Estate of Thramm, 67 Cal.App.2d 659 and 80 Cal.App.2d 756; Estate of Brast, 69 Cal.App.2d 705;
Estate of Giordano, 85 Cal.App.2d 588; Crowley v. Allen, 52 F.Supp. 850; Allen v. Markham
(9th C.C.A.), 147 F.2d 136; Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 90 L.Ed. 256, 66 S.Ct. 296; Allen v.
Markham (9th C.C.A.), 156 F.2d 653; Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 91 L.Ed. 1633, 67 S.Ct. 1431;
see, also, Estate of Nielsen, 118 Mont. 304, 165 P.2d 792; Duke of Richmond v. Milne, 17 La. 312,
36 Am.Dec. 613.
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exclusive grant of treaty-making powers to the federal government,' that they
were an interference with the control of foreign affairs,9 that they invaded
federal control over interstate and foreign commerce,'" that they were an
illegal deprivation of an "inherent natural right to take by will or succes-
sion,"" that they conflicted with federal war powers 2 including the right to
make "captures upon land" -of the property of enemy aliens,'3 that they
denied "due process,"' 4 and that they constituted a statute of forfeiture 5 or
of retribution and confiscation within the domain of federal power over
foreign affairs. 6 In the Bevilacqua case" the California Supreme Court held
that the sections did not constitute a "special law" within the ban of section
25 of article IV of the state Constitution. The subject matter is within legis-
lative control and the statute operates uniformly on all persons within the
same class, and it cannot be said that there is an arbitrary classification.'"
While constitutionally sound, the statute is subordinate to any treaty
granting conflicting rights to aliens. Rights to succession to property are
determined by local law, but those rights may be controlled by an overriding
federal policy, as where a treaty makes different or conflicting arrangements,
in which case the state policy must give way.
Effect of Treaties
The provisions of (a federal) treaty, until superseded or abrogated, will
prevail over any conflicting requirements of California law. 9 Treaties are
the supreme law of the land. The effect of a treaty upon a conflicting state
law of succession is not to void the state law, but to suspend its operation to
the extent that it conflicts with the treaty and only during the life of that
treaty.2" This raises the question of when a treaty terminates otherwise than
by its own terms or by express renunciation.
In Clark v. Allen the treaty at issue was a general treaty with Germany.2
It was contended that the complete treaty, including sections governing recip-
8Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503; Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653.
9Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503.
10170 A.L.R. 966, Annotations, covering many constitutional challenges to these and similar
statutes; see, also, 137 A.L.R. 1328, 147 A.L.R. 1297, 150 A.L.R. 1418, 152 A.L.R. 1450.
"1Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal.2d 573; Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal.2d 580.
"Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653.
"Ibid.
"Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal.2d 580; Estate of Hill, 179 Cal. 683.
'Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal.2d 580; Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal.2d 573; Estate of Giordano,
85 CaLApp.2d 588.
"8 Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653.
"'Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal.2d 580.
"Ibid.
"Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503.
"Byrne 1. Drain, 127 Cal. 663; Blythe v. Hinkley, 127 Cal. 433; affirmed, 180 U.S. 333, 45 LEd.
557, 21 S.Ct. 390.
"1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights with Germany.
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rocal rights to take property, was abrogated either by the outbreak of war
with Germany or by the unconditional surrender and collapse of its govern-
ment in 1945. The United States Supreme Court held that treaty rights to
take reciprocally still existed in full force although other treaty provisions
had been annulled. The outbreak of war does not necessarily suspend or
abrogate treaty provisions, but there may be such an incompatibility between
a particular treaty provision and maintenance of a state of war as to make
it clear that it should not be enforced, or the President or Congress may have
formulated a national policy inconsistent with enforcement of a treaty in
whole or in part.22
The Trading with the Enemy Act and various executive orders were not
incompatible with continuance of treaty provisions as to inheritance.2" Vest-
ing an alien's interest in an agency of the government (Alien Property Cus-
todian) is discretionary and does not deprive the alien of all benefits of inheri-
tance (the assets may be applied to pay his American creditors) 24
Generally, treaty provisions permitting subjects of one power "to con-
tinue to hold and transmit land in the territory of the other survive the
outbreak of war."25
Whether a state is in a position to perform its treaty obligations is essen-
tially a political, not a judicial question." Where there is "no evidence that
the political departments have considered collapse and unconditional sur-
render of (a country) as putting an end to such provisions of a treaty as
survived the outbreak of war or obligations of either party with respect to
them," this court will not hold that a provision in the treaty relating to
testamentary disposition of realty had failed to survive the war because, as
a result of defeat and occupation, the other party had allegedly ceased to
exist as an independent or international community. 7
Congress may enact a rule inconsistent with continued observance of a
treaty and Congress's action would control the action of the courts.28 "While
war is still flagrant and the will of the political departments unrevealed,"
. . . "as one provision or another (of a treaty) is involved in some actual
controversy," the courts must "determine whether, alone, or by force of
connection with an inseparable scheme, the provision is inconsistent with the
policy or safety of the nation in the emergency of war, and hence, presumably
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intended to be limited to times of peace. The mere fact that other portions
of the treaty are suspended, or even abrogated is not conclusive.
29
By clear implication, treaties with governments which have gone into
exile have full force and validity so long as the federal government recognizes
such governments even though a government's native land is completely
occupied by enemy military forces or governed de facto by a different group.
Purpose and Effect of Reciprocity Requirement
"The obvious purpose of the statute was to permit a nonresident alien
to inherit when the laws of his country would permit an American citizen to
inherit under the same circumstances.30
The reciprocal rights need not be immediately enforceable in the country
of the alien's residence to satisfy section 259. The Legislature was concerned
only with the existence of rights accorded to United States citizens by and
under the legally-constituted and recognized laws and government of the
country of which the alien claimant was a citizen and resident . . . knowing
that such rights persist . . . in spite of the immediate fluctuations of war,
and that, at most, the remedies for the enforcement of the right may be tempo-
rarily suspended. 3
The statute states a condition precedent to the existence of any right in
an alien to share in any way in a California estate./ The state has power to
regulate the right of inheritance and succession and testamentary disposition
of property within the state.33 In Estate of Knutzen34 an intestate decedent
left as his next of kin a brother in California and two sisters and a brother
as resident nationals in Germany. The Alien Property Custodian vested the
interest of the German relatives in himself and asserted that they had taken
a defeasible interest at death, that section 259 was not self-executing but
merely provided for defeasance or forfeiture and that their interest having
passed to one not barred from taking or holding prior to any action to defeat
or forfeit the aliens' interest, section 259 could not be invoked to defeat him.
Early California cases 5 supported the assertion that an alien would take a
"lbid., 509-510.
"Estate of Blak, 65 Cal.App.2d 232.
"Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal.2d 573.
"Estate of Michaud, 53 CaLApp.2d 835.
"Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653, citing 314 U.S. 556.
"Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal.2d 573.
" 5 Cal. 373, 2 Cal. 588, 26 Cal. 455, 32 Cal. 376. These California cases represent an extension
to cover intestate succession of the common-law rule that "an alien could take title by gift, grant,
bequest or devise which would be good against all the world except the sovereign, and that such
alien could convey to a non-alien an indefeasible title at any time prior to "Inquest of Office" or other
proceeding, or legislative act equivalent thereto (to effect a defeasance or forfeiture). The rule did
not apply to succession by descent. The rule was applied to land in Fairfax v. Hunter (1813),
7 Cranch (U.S.) 603, 3 LEd. 453, and to personalty in Marshall v. Conrad (1805), 5 Call (Va.) 364,
which paraphrased Lord Coke in Croft's Case.
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defeasible title by succession. The California Supreme Court held that none
of these cases involved a statute like 259.
"Its clear purpose is to regulate succession. The right to succession is not
an inherent or natural right, but one which exists only by statutory authority,
and it is only by virtue of the state that the heir is entitled to receive any of his
ancestor's estate."36 "The proper construction is that sections 259 et seq. are
laws of succession, that they constitute limitations on the power of aliens to inherit,
and that nonresident aliens . . . acquire no rights in the estate in the absence of
reciprocal rights. .... -37
If reciprocal rights or treaty rights are proven to exist as to realty or
personalty but not both, an alien may take property of the class as to which
such rights exist, but may be barred from taking the other class.3" A further
problem (unlitigated) arises where reciprocity exists as to "realty or other
immovable property or interests therein,39 since "immovables" as defined
in private international law does not follow Anglo-Saxon divisions between
real and personal property. Section 259 is now phrased to reflect this subdivi-
sion of reciprocal rights as to realty and personalty, treating them separately.
When Applicable
The statute is applicable whenever it is shown that one or more of those
who would otherwise have an interest in the estate is an alien nonresident.
While the statute is normally invoked by a party claiming adversely to such
alien, it may be raised by the court of its own motion.40
The statute bars only those claimants who are both aliens and nonresi-
dents of the United States or its territories. In Estate of Brast testatrix devised
realty to her niece . . . "of County Mayo, Ireland." The niece sued to set
aside a deed to the realty made by testatrix in a period of great mental and
physical weakness shortly prior to death. Defendant asserted that the niece
was unable to maintain the suit because barred of any interest by section
259. The court held that in the absence of proof of the niece's alienage the
section could not be invoked.41
Applicable to Whom
If one otherwise barred by section 259 seeks to avoid its bar by asserting
overriding treaty rights he may of course base his claim upon such treaty
in the state court and appeal if necessary to the United States Supreme Court.
Alternatively he may go into the federal courts while probate is pending.
"Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal.2d 573, citing 314 U.S. 556, 21 CaL2d 561, 191 Cal. 591, 117 Cal. 281.
.'Ibid., accord, Estate of Bevilacqua, Estate of Giordano.
"Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503.
"'1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights with Germany.
"Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal.2d 573.
"Estate of Brast, 69 Cal.App.2d 705.
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Federal courts may entertain suits in favor of creditors, legatees, and heirs
and other claimants under federal law against a decedent's estate to establish
their claims as a "civil suit in the nature of equity" so long as federal courts
do not interfere with probate proceedings or assume general jurisdiction of
the probate or control of the property in custody of state courts. The state
court is bound by the judgment to recognize a right adjudicated by a federal
court.4 2
Section 259.1 places the burden of proof of reciprocity upon the alien
nonresident who claims an interest in the estate.4" The burden remains upon
any successor to that interest or any person claiming rights dependent upon
the alien claimant's interest. The Alien Property Custodian, upon vesting
the supposed interest of an alien in himself, was held bound to satisfy sec-
tion 259 (if raised) before he could show any interest.4 4 When a relative of
decedent sought letters of administration as sole heir and testified without
contradiction that all nearer relatives, all those named in decedent's will, were
nonresident aliens, he was entitled to rely upon the statute and the public
administrator had no priority of right to administer the estate unless he first
satisfied section 259."5 The public administrator's sole claim to the right
to administer depends upon a showing that the claimant is not "the next of
kin entitled to share in the estate" (Prob. Code, 422). Incapacity of the heirs
first entitled to succeed to property will not effect an escheat, but the property
will pass to the persons next entitled to take as though the first heirs had never
existed.46 The resident claimant need not be of equally close degree of kin-
ship as the nonresident alien claimants 47 nor need he claim through ancestors
who would not have been ineligible because of alienage.48 Section 259 when
construed with the common law rule of escheat stated above entitled the resi-
dent heir to take. The public administrator has not shown that the local
claimant is not the "next of kin entitled to share in the estate" since the right
of all nearer relatives depends upon section 259 and 259.1 which require
that the alien establish the existence of reciprocal rights as a condition prece-
dent to any right to share in the estate of a California decedent. When the
nonresidence and alienage of all nearer relatives has been established, any
person purporting to act in right of such aliens must establish that such recip-
rocal right exists.49
"Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490.
"Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal.2d 573; Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal.2d 580.
"'Estate of Giordano, 85 Cal.App.2d 588.
"5 Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal.2d 580.
"Ibid., Estate of Michaud, quoting the common law and citing Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat. (U.S.)
453.
"Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal.2d 580.
"Ibid.
"'Estate of Michaud, 53 Cal.App.2d 835; Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal.2d 580; Estate of Knutzen,
31 Cal.2d 573.
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Applicability-When Raised
The issue of whether an alien nonresident has a legal claim to an interest
in an estate may be adjudicated in several ways. The alien may bring an
action in the federal courts if he claims his interest arises out of a treaty."0
He can wait to assert his claim in support of, or in opposition to, a petition for
distribution. If some relative claiming as next of kin to the exclusion of an
alien's claim, or the public administrator purporting to act by reason of the
alien's asserted disability to take as sole heir, or his disability to qualify as
executor or administrator, seeks appointment as administrator, the issue of
the alien's right to take under Probate Code section 259 may be litigated in
the absence of all claimants not directly involved in that question. The deci-
sion will be res judicata as to all parties to that determination, but will not
bind other claimants who are not parties. This immediate determination of
the claim is authorized as necessary to the determination of the question of
who is the proper person within the priorities stated in Probate Code section
422 to claim appointment as administrator. That question can be settled only
after the court has found whether or not the alien claimant does in fact have
a valid claim to an interest in the estate. 51
Burden of Proof-Upon Whom?
The burden of proof laid by section 259.1 is a substantive requirement
of law, not just a procedural reglation. The 1945 amendment creating the
presumption of the existence of reciprocal rights and shifting the burden of
proof was a substantive change in the law which cannot be given retroactive
effect because it would destroy vested rights." The proper construction is
that sections 259 et seq. are laws of succession.5" Nonresidents were made
ineligible to inherit in the absence of reciprocal rights. Title to property of
a decedent's estate passes at death to the heir or devisee (Prob. Code, 300).
If the estate had once vested in the heirs the Legislature had no power there-
after by a subsequent law to divest it. The statute in effect at the time of the
death of decedent must control.54
The September 1947 amendments produced the present sections replac-
ing upon the aliens nonresident the burden of proving reciprocity. There is
no presumption that foreign law is the same as California law where the
foreign law is not proved.5
"°Estate of Knutzen, 31 CaL2d 573.
"mlbid.
"Estate of Thramm, 80 CaLApp.2d 756.
"Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal2d 573.
"Estate of Giordano, 85 Cal.App.2d 588; Estate of Thramm (dictum).
"Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal.2d 573.
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There is nothing arbitrary (lack of "due process") in the provisions
placing the burden of proof on the nonresident aliens, who presumably are
in a much better position than residents to obtain information concerning
the law of their country of residence." 6
Section 259.1 and the burden of proof there imposed control the claims
of anyone purporting to act as successor in interest to the alien nonresident
claimant or by reason of the asserted disability of the alien arising out of
his alienage and nonresidence. In the Bevilacqua case the public adminis-
trator asserted that sections 259 et seq. did not apply to him, that the statute
was limited in its operation to nonresidents and did not impose any burden
of proof upon the state nor upon its officer, the public administrator; and
that he claimed as an official performing governmental functions under an
official duty. The court stated the rule of statutory construction that general
language will not be interpreted as applying to agencies of the government
in the absence of a specific expression of legislative intent. It then said that
the rule is applied where otherwise the result would be to infringe upon
sovereign governmental powers.5" Where, however, no impairment of sov-
ereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule . . . ceases to
exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the
statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory
language only.5"
Under Probate Code section 422, the next of kin, when entitled to share
in the estate, has priority over the public administrator and when a relative
makes a prima facie showing that he is the next of kin and entitled to share
in the estate, the public administrator, if he seeks to obtain letters, must
undertake the burden of disproving those claims.59
Burden of Proof-How Satisfied?
California has held that where an alien nonresident enemy claimed as
sole heir to personal property of one who died in this country during World
War I, he might be entitled to a continuance, until peace, of a proceeding for
distribution of the estate, brought by parties claiming in a more remote
degree, where he could not fully establish his claims because of the war."0
If this decision still is good law, it would seem probable that California courts
would allow similar delays to aliens resident in allied countries occupied by
enemy forces or residing in neutral countries cut off from free communica-
tion.
5 Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal.2d 580.
"fbid., citing 12 Cal.2d 140, 48 CaI.App.2d 337.
581 bid., citing 21 Cal.2d 399.
"9Ibid., citing 210 Cal. 262, 142 Cal. 125, 26 Cal.App.2d 319.
"0Re Henricks (1919), 180 Cal. 175.
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Estate of Blak held that a resident national of the Occupied Netherlands
who was unable to communicate with the United States could appear through
her government by its authorized agent, its ambassador.6 Montana, with a
similar statute, permitted an appearance for a resident national of Occupied
Denmark to be made by the minister to this country although the Danish gov-
ernment was in power and control of enemy occupation forces.6"
The existence of reciprocal rights may be proved by treaty with the
country of the alien's residence." But section 259 "does not refer to treaties,
and there is nothing in its wording which requires the construction that
'reciprocal rights' as used . . .means 'rights established by treaty'. Such
a construction would defeat the obvious purpose of the statute which was to
permit a nonresident alien to inherit when the laws of his country would
permit an American citizen to inherit under the same circumstances.
Evidence of the foreign domestic law is therefore admissible to prove the
existence of reciprocal inheritance rights." '64
California permitted proof of reciprocity to be made through introduc-
tion of a translation of Dutch domestic statutes certified correct by the ambas-
sador of the Royal Netherlands' government-in-exile, and accompanied by
a certificate of the United States State Department that it similarly interpreted
Dutch law, that the law had not been changed by the government-in-exile, that
the United States recognized that government as the only legal government
of the Netherlands, and that such law was regarded as controlling although
all the domestic territory was occupied and de facto governed by the Ger-
man armies. 5 The state Supreme Court then held that "right to take and
receive . . . in section 259 meant "legal right" and so found reciprocity
to exist.
Reciprocal rights have also been established in other states by the
opinion of eminent jurists (including the Lord High Justice) of the country
concerned, 6 and by the treatises of eminent professors and testimony as to
the unwritten law by a lawyer (legation legal counselor) who had conducted
cases in point in the country concerned. 7 In the latter case it was admitted
that there were no statutes nor decisions directly in point, but in practice
reciprocity did exist ("the idea [that an alien might not be competent to take]
is completely foreign to the Danish legal mind.")
:'Estate of Blak, 65 Cal.App.2d 232.
'Estate of Nielsen, 118 Mont. 304,165 P.2d 792.
:'Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653.
'Ibid., Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal2d 573.
"Estate of Blak, 65 CaLApp.2d 232.
"Duke of Richmond v. Milne (1841), 17 La. 312, 36 Am.Dec. 613.
"Nielsen's Estate, 118 Mont. 304, 165 P.2d 792 (Denmark during the German occupation).
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General Conclusions
California's statutes impose a number of restrictions limiting the effect
of Civil Code section 671 and restricting the right of nonresident aliens to
take various kinds of property from California estates, whether by gift,
bequest, devise or succession. Where such an alien would otherwise be quali-
fied to take, Porbate Code section 259, as a further restriction, requires proof
of the existence of a reciprocal right in Americans to take like property upon
a nondiscriminatory basis from an estate in the alien's country.
Such statutes as those here discussed are clearly within the constitutional
power of the state. They are controlling except to the extent that they may
be suspended for the time being by an existent over-riding federal treaty.
While this principle is clear, it may be very difficult to advise, as to
an alien's rights in a given case, whether some treaty is or may be applicable.
The difficulties are increased when war exists with the country concerned, or
diplomatic relations have been suspended, or the contracting government
has been overthrown and replaced by a de facto government, or by a de jure
government which has not specifically assumed and recognized a pre-existent
treaty.
The suspension or abrogation of a treaty may be implied from a variety
of acts or conditions, and may affect less than all provisions of a treaty. As
a general rule, treaty rights in aliens to take and hold property tend to subsist
even though most other treaty rights have become void or inoperative.
Regardless of the voluntary exile or ejectment of a governmental group from
a foreign country, so long as our goernment recognizes that group as the
de jure government of such country all treaties made with or assumed by that
government are controlling upon our courts as establishing the law of that
country.
Similarly that body of rules which such a group asserts to be the
domestic law of the country of which it is the recognized de jure government
will be, if our state department concurs, the controlling law of that country
insofar as our courts are concerned regardless of the nonpresence of that
group within the boundaries of its country and regardless of such group's
complete absence of control over such territory. This remains true even
though some rival government is in fact presently enforcing quite different
rules of law within the foreign country. Section 259 is satisfied by proof of
a recognized legally-existent right of reciprocity regardless of the present
enforceability of that right.
Reciprocal rights need not be established by treaty, but the statute is
satisfied if the foregn country's internal law in fact would not discriminate
against an American claimant to an estate there. Where the alien depends
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upon treaty rights American courts will take judicial notice of the existence
and content of a treaty. It would seem necessary for the alien, at some stage
of the proceedings, to assert the existence of an applicable treaty.
When the issue of the effect of section 259 has been raised the burden
is now squarely placed, by section 259.1, upon any alien nonresident claim-
ant to prove the existence of reciprocal rights. This burden is a substantive
requirement which cannot be modified subsequent to the death of the person
whose estate is in litigation. This substantive burden is also imposed upon
any person who, in a public or private capacity, asserts any claim to an
estate as successor in interest to such an alien, or whose purported interest in,
or right to control over, the corpus of the estate is dependent upon the unestab-
lished existence of some right in such an alien to take some portion of the
estate.
An alien claimant may appear in person, but he need not do so. He
may appear through a local lawyer, his attorney in fact, or the properly
authorized diplomatic representative of his country. Perhaps one asserting
the existence of a right in an alien to take may be entitled to a reasonable
delay for such period as may reasonably be necessary where war prevents
the collection or presentation of the proofs needed to establish such right.
It seems clear that, with the marked increase in the population of Cali-
fornia and of the number of refugees within its borders, Probate section 259
will require a great increase in California's reference materials manifesting
foreign nations' domestic laws and evidencing the foreign relations and
treaties of the United States. Many conflicts-of-laws questions may also be
presented for determination.
Unsettled Questions
A number of interesting questions remain unsettled. When a treaty
grants reciprocal rights as to "immovables and interests therein," what defi-
nition of "immovables" will be applied in a given case? Section 259 requires
that reciprocity exist in the country of the alien's "citizenship and residence."
When the claimant is a citizen of one foreign country but resident or domi-
ciled in another, must he prove reciprocal rights to exist in one or both such
countries? If in one only, will that one be designated by the court or has the
alien an option to make proof as to either? Is the word "residence" to be
interpreted as meaning "domicile" or as "current residence" only?
Where California would distribute property to designated persons and
"to their descendants by right of representation" (as under Probate Code
secs. 228 and 229) and the normal first taker is barred by section 259, will
any descendant of such taker be eligible to take? The common law rule of
escheat has been phrased as stating that when the first taker was barred for
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alienage, the next more remote relative would take as though the first taker
had never existed.6"
Another problem arises with respect to countries which may apply pure
communist theory and hence completely forbid any holding of private prop-
erty. Obviously such a country would not be discriminating between the
rights of American claimants and those granted its own citizens. The literal
right "to take . . . on the same basis as citizens of such foreign country,
without discrimination" would exist. Would our courts declare that reci-
procity existed, or hold that "to take" necessarily implies that there must
be a legal possibility of the existence of some estate which could pass and be
taken? This question may arise in litigation as a result of the governmental
imposition in Eastern Europe of linmitations upon the total value, quantity,
and kind of property which may be privately held.
"8See footnote 46 and textual matter to which it refers.
